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Abstract: The theory of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been 
developed almost exclusively from the study of large deals by large firms. 
In this paper we argue that the behaviour and success of M&As by small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) may be significantly different. 
Accordingly, we revisit established M&A theories, and develop a 
theoretical framework, and several testable hypotheses, regarding the 
distinctive features of SME M&As. Our empirical results support our 
expectations and show that, compared to large firms, acquiring SMEs: rely 
more intensively on external growth via M&As; are more likely to be 
withdrawn, suggesting that SMEs are more flexible, and more able to 
avoid deals that turn sour; and, finally, SME M&As are more likely to be 
financed with equity rather than debt, indicating that the influential 
financial pecking order theory is of less relevance to SMEs. 
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Introduction 
There is a long tradition of academic research on mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) within finance, business and economics.
 1
 Since the 
very beginning, this has considered questions relating to performance 
evaluation and has been concerned, primarily, with issues relating, for 
example, to what sort of returns mergers generate, and for whom. 
The focus of this research, however, has been on the role of the larger 
M&A events, and precious little attention has been devoted to the question 
of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Probably the most 
prominent reason for this is because most SMEs are not publicly quoted - 
a fact which makes it difficult to obtain reliable data on their general 
activity, let alone to evaluate their M&A performance records
2
.  
And yet size does matter in mergers and acquisitions (see e.g., Moeller 
et al., 2004; 2005) and SMEs are anything but insignificant. In the 
European context, SMEs are thought to represent about 99% of all firms, 
to employ between them about 65 million people, and to drive innovation 
and competition. At a global level, SMEs may even be responsible for 
between 40% to 50% of world GDP (European Commission, 2005) 
In this paper we attempt to include this important but long ignored 
sector of the economy, by explicitly considering the activity of the small 
and medium sized entrepreneurial firm within the M&A industry.  
We present direct and indirect evidence which suggests not only that 
the behaviour and financial success of mergers by SMEs may significantly 
differ from larger public firms, but also that the underlying merger 
theories which motivate these ventures might need to be revisited to 
account for this discrepancy. The existing evidence on mergers and 
acquisitions has been almost exclusively developed on the basis of large 
public firms and this, we suggest, needs to be corrected. 
This paper makes a modest attempt at rectifying this long held bias. It 
does so by: firstly, studying and selecting the relevant merger theories; 
secondly, by translating these into a number of testable hypotheses on 
SME M&As; and, finally, by empirically considering and commenting 
upon the applicability of these theories to the special case of SME M&As.  
                                                 
1
 Although technically inaccurate, it is common practice within the literature to use the 
terms ‗merger‘, ‗acquisition‘, ‗takeover‘ and ‗M&A‘ synonymously. 
2
 The vast majority of performance studies employ event study methodologies that rely 
on abnormal returns of publicly traded stock prices, and without an initial public 
offering, most small to medium sized, privately held entrepreneurial firms 
(especially in their early stages or when they simply are too small to be of any 
interest for public equity) are automatically excluded from these studies. 
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In doing so, we find that, compared to large firms, acquiring SMEs are: 
(1) more likely to rely on M&A as an external growth option; (2) more 
likely withdraw from a deal, a finding which, we suggest, implies that 
SMEs are more flexible, and better able to avoid deals that turn sour; and 
(3) that SME M&As are more likely to be financed with equity over debt, 
indicating that the pecking order theory is of less relevance to SMEs. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section Two begins by overviewing 
the literature on mergers, and by developing a number of hypotheses on 
how these might relate to SMEs.
1
 Section Three introduces the data and 
methodology, which we employ for testing, and Section Four discusses the 
results and major implications of our research. Section Five concludes the 
discussion by drawing implications, and by suggesting some potential 
avenues for future research on SME mergers and acquisitions.  
1 Literature and Hypotheses  
To understand the role of the SME within the M&A industry we 
explore a number of questions. We begin by asking ‗who‘ are the small 
and medium sized entrepreneurial firms of interest to our research? 
Secondly, we ask ‗why‘ these SMEs merge, and ‗why‘ we should expect 
them to perform differently to larger firms? Next, we consider ‗how‘ we 
expect them to perform, and finally, we explore through ‗what‘ 
mechanisms we expect SMEs to finance their mergers and acquisitions.  
2.1. Who are the SMEs?  
At present there is no consensus on the threshold at which enterprises 
are considered ‗small‘, ‗medium‘ or ‗large‘. As illustrated by Table 1, 
current European definitions, for example, categorise companies with 
fewer than 10 employees as being ‗micro‘ enterprises, those with fewer 
than 50 as being ―small‖, and those with fewer than 250 as ―medium‖ (EU 
Commission, 2005). The US, by contrast, defines ―small‖ as having fewer 
than 100 employees, and medium as having fewer than 500.  
The distinction of entrepreneurial firms is at least equally debated (see 
e.g., Johnson, 2007), and the existing merger data does not distinguish 
them along a predetermined working definition. At present, 
entrepreneurial firms are variously distinguished in terms of ownership 
profiles, innovativeness and risk attitudes, with the effect that markedly 
different sets of firms can be studied within the field entrepreneurship.  
                                                 
1
 Note that we focus on theories that explain individual mergers and not mergers waves. 
Several approaches attempt to explain a commonly observed wave-like pattern of 
mergers. See Martynova and Renneboog, 2008 for an excellent review. 
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Based on the data available to us, however, and the focus of both the 
relevant empirical studies on mergers (see below) and on the economic 
role of entrepreneurial firms, we believe that it is reasonable to suggest 
that the (single) set of SMEs will overlap significantly with the set of 
entrepreneurial firms. We assume that, in general, entrepreneurial firms, 
and in particular nascent ventures, will be smaller firms, and also that they 
will have more private than public equity than the average of the total 
population of firms (see Johnson, 2007; Deakins and Freel, 2006). We 
fully appreciate that such a definition is imperfect, but suggest that, in the 
presence of data limitations, the overlap between the two will be 
sufficiently large to provide us with some useful results.  
 
Table 1: European Commission SME Definitions 
Category Headcount Turnover* Assets* Independence
Micro Enterprises <10 <=2mil <=2mil no subsidiary**
Small Enterprises <50; >=10 <=10mil <=10mil no subsidiary**
Medium Enterprises <250; >=50 <=50mil <=43mil no subsidiary**
Large Enterprises >=250 >50mil >43mil
* At least one of these conditions have to be satisfied.
  All monetary values in current Euros (also for U.S. bidders).
** The detailed conditions for independence are more complex (see source above)  
2.2. Why do SMEs Merge?  
The question of ‗why‘ – ‗why‘ do SMEs merge, and ‗why‘ should we 
expect them to perform differently to large firms – is not so easily 
addressed. To answer these sorts of questions we must consider the 
applicability of the various merger theories, and must overview the 
literature which has been put forward to explain mergers in general. Due 
to the existence of some empirical findings, which suggest that mergers 
under-perform the market, this literature has been divided into two broad 
schools – the value-increasing, efficient market school, and value-
decreasing agency schools – and in our analysis we adopt this method. 
The Value-Increasing Theories  
According to the value increasing school, mergers occur, broadly, 
because mergers generate ‗synergies‘ between the acquirer and the target, 
and synergies, in turn, increases the value of the firm (Hitt et al., 2001).  
The theory of efficiency suggests, in fact, that mergers will only occur 
when they are expected to generate enough realisable synergies to make 
the deal beneficial to both parties; it is the symmetric expectations of gains 
which results in a ‗friendly‘ merger being proposed and accepted. If the 
5 
 
gain in value to the target was not positive, it is suggested, the target 
firm‘s owners would not sell or submit to the acquisition, and if the gains 
were negative to the bidders‘ owners, the bidder would not complete the 
deal. Hence, if we observe a merger deal, efficiency theory predicts value 
creation with positive returns to both the acquirer and the target. Banerjee 
and Eckard (1998) and Klein (2001) evidence this suggestion.  
Following Chatterjee (1986), we must, however, distinguish between 
‗operative synergies‘ – or ‗efficiency gains‘ achieved through economies 
of scale and scope – and ‗allocative synergies‘ – or ‗collusive synergies‘ 
resultant from increased market power and an improved ability to extract 
consumer surplus – when commenting on value creation in mergers and 
acquisitions. Most of the more recent literature concludes that operating 
synergies are the more significant source of gain (see e.g., Devos et al., 
2008; Houston et al., 2001; Mukherjee et al., 2004)1, although it does also 
suggest that market power theory remains a valid merger motive. 
Increased ‗allocative‘ synergies is said to offer the firm positive and 
significant private benefits (Feinberg, 1985) because, ceteris paribus, 
firms with greater market power charge higher prices and earn greater 
margins through the appropriation of consumer surplus. Indeed, a number 
of studies find increased profits and decreased sales after many mergers 
(Prager, 1992; Chatterjee, 1986; Kim and Singal, 1993; Sapienza, 2002; 
Cefis et al., 2008) - a finding which has been interpreted by many as 
evidence of increasing market power and allocative synergy gains (see 
e.g., Gugler et al., 2003). From a dynamic point of view too, market power 
is said to allow for the deterrence of potential future entrants (Motta, 2004; 
Besanko, 2006; Gugler et al., 2003), which can again afford the firm a 
significant premium, and so offer another long-term source of gain2.   
In an efficient merger market the theory of corporate control provides a 
third justification, beyond simply synergistic gains, for why mergers must 
create value. It suggests that there is always another firm or management 
team willing to acquire an underperforming firm, to remove those 
managers who have failed to capitalise on the opportunities to create 
synergies, and thus to improve the performance of its assets (Weston et al., 
2004). Managers who offer the highest value to the owners, it suggests, 
will take over the right to manage the firm until they themselves are 
replaced by another team that discovers an even higher value for its assets. 
                                                 
1
 Mukherjee et al. (2004) find that 90% of managers identify operative motives as a 
reason to merge, and Devos et al. (2008) suggest that, of a total 10.3% synergy gain, 
some 8.3% arise through operative synergies.  
2
 Few bidders, of course, openly announce the goal of increased market power as an 
explicit merger motivation, but the fact that horizontal mergers – that is, mergers 
between competitors – dominate the M&A industry (Gugler et al., 2003) is surely 
indicative of just how popular it is as a merger motive.  
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Hence, inefficient managers will supply the ‗market for corporate control‘ 
(Manne, 1965), and managers that do not maximise profits will not 
survive, even if the competitive forces on their product and input markets 
fails to eliminate them. ‗Hostile‘ takeovers should, as a result, be observed 
amongst poorly performing firms, and amongst those whose internal 
corporate governance mechanisms have failed to discipline their 
managers. Once again the empirical evidence again seems to support this 
conclusion (see e.g., Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986). 
From the bidder‘s perspective, the theory of corporate control is 
partially based on efficiency theory, although there are two important 
differences. First, it does not assume, per se, the existence of synergies 
between the corporate assets of both firms, but rather between the bidder‘s 
managerial capabilities and the targets assets. Hence, corporate control 
predicts managerial efficiencies from the re-allocation of under-utilized 
assets. Second, it implies that the target‘s management team is likely to 
resist takeover attempts, as the team itself and its managerial inefficiency 
is the main obstacle to an improved utilization of assets. Typical bidders 
are either private investors – or ‗corporate raiders‘– who bring in more 
competent management teams, or more efficient firms, as measured by 
Tobin‘s Q, with better growth prospects and superior performance. 
The Value-Destroying Theories  
The impact of mergers and acquisitions on the performance of the 
acquiring firm remains, however, at best, ―inconclusive‖ and, at worst, 
―systematic[ally] detrimental‖ (Dickerson et al., 1997). Mergers fail to 
create value, it is suggested – with somewhere between 60 and 80% 
classified as ‗failures‘ (Puranam and Singh, 1999) – and a number of value 
destroying theories have been put forward  in explanation. 
Generally speaking, these value-destroying theories can be divided into 
two groups: the first assumes that the bidder‘s management is ‗boundedly 
rational‘, and thus makes mistakes and incurs losses due to informational 
constraints despite what are generally value-increasing intentions. The 
second assumes rational but self-serving managers, who maximise a 
private utility function, which at least fails to positively affect firm value. 
Within the first category, the theory of managerial hubris (Roll, 1986) 
suggests that managers may have good intentions in increasing their firm‘s 
value but, being over-confident, they over-estimate their abilities to create 
synergies. Over-confidence increases the probability of overpaying 
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier and Tate, 2008), and may 
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leave the winning bidder in the situation of a winner's-curse
1
, which 
dramatically increases the chances of failure (Dong et al., 2006). 
Empirically speaking, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) find strong 
evidence of hubris in US takeovers, and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) 
find the same in a European context. The latter estimate that about one 
third of the large takeovers in the 1990s suffered from some form of 
hubris. Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that overly optimistic 
managers, who voluntarily retain in-the-money stock options in their own 
firms, more frequently engage in less profitable diversifying mergers, and 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find that hubris is more likely to be seen 
amongst low book-to-market ratio firms – that is, amongst the so-called 
‗glamour firms‘ – than amongst high book-to-market ratio ‗value firms‘.  
Jensen‘s (1986) theory of managerial discretion claims that it is not 
over-confidence that drives unproductive acquisitions, but rather the 
presence of excess liquidity, or free cash flow (FCF). Firms whose internal 
funds are in excess of the investments required to fund positive net present 
value projects, it is suggested, are more likely to make quick strategic 
decisions, and are more likely to engage in large-scale strategic actions 
with less analysis than their cash-strapped peers. High levels of liquidity 
increase managerial discretion, making it increasingly possible for 
managers to choose poor acquisitions when they run out of good ones 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Indeed, several empirical studies 
demonstrate that the abnormal share price reaction to takeover 
announcements by cash-rich bidders is negative and decreasing in the 
amount of FCF held by the bidder (see e.g., Harford, 1999). Moreover, it 
is suggested that the other stakeholders in the firm will be more likely to 
give management the benefit of the doubt in such situations, and to 
approve acquisition plans on the basis of fuzzy and subjective concepts 
such as managerial ‗instincts‘, ‗gut feelings‘ and ‗intuition‘, based on high 
past and current cash flows (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). Thus, like the 
hubris theory, the theory of FCF suggests that otherwise well-intentioned 
mangers make bad decisions, not out of malice, but simply because the 
quality of their decisions are less challenged than they would be in the 
absence of excess liquidity.  
Of course, as the degree of managerial discretion increases in FCF, or 
in high market valuations (as in the case of ‗glamour firms‘ above), or in 
other proxies, so, too, does the opportunity for self-interested managers to 
pursue self-serving acquisitions (Jensen, 2005). It is generally agreed that 
managerial self-interest does play a role in M&A; research has shown that 
                                                 
1
 The winner's curse is a phenomenon that occurs in common value auctions with 
incomplete information. If the auctioned item is worth roughly the same to all 
bidders, the winner is the bidder who makes the highest estimate of its value. If we 
assume that the average bid is accurate, the winning bidder overpays. 
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bidder returns are, for example, generally higher when the manager of the 
acquiring firm is a large shareholder (Lewellen et al., 1985), and lower 
when management is not (Lang et al., 1991; Harford 1999). This suggests 
that managers pay more attention to an acquisition when they themselves 
are financially concerned. Further, it supports the notion of ‗agency cost‘ 
and the ‗managerial theories‘ of the firm‘ (Berle and Means, 1932; Marris, 
1963), which broadly suggest that managers pursue self-serving 
acquisitions, and it is this fact that leads to value-destruction.  
The theory of managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), 
for example, claims that unsuccessful mergers occur because managers 
primarily make investments that minimise the risk of replacement. It 
suggests that managers pursue projects not in an effort to maximise 
enterprise value, but in an effort to entrench themselves by increasing their 
individual value to the firm. Entrenching managers will, accordingly, 
make manager-specific investments that make it more costly for 
shareholders to replace them, and value will be reduced because free 
resources are invested in manager-specific assets rather than in a 
shareholder value-maximising alternative. Amihud and Lev (1981) 
empirically support this notion, and suggest that managers pursue 
diversifying mergers in order to decrease earnings volatility which, in turn, 
enhances corporate survival and protects their positions.
1
 
Of course, entrenchment is not only pursued for job security itself, but 
also because entrenched managers may be able to extract more wealth, 
power, reputation and fame. While entrenchment theory primarily explains 
the process of how managers position themselves to achieve these 
objectives, the theory of empire-building and other related, well-tested 
theories provide both the motivations and evidence behind these 
objectives (Marris, 1963; 1964; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Rhoades, 
1983; Black, 1989). According to empire theory, managers are explicitly 
motivated to invest in the growth of their firm‘s revenues (sales) or asset 
base, subject to a minimum profit requirement (Marris, 1963).2  
                                                 
1
 Shleifer and Vishny (1991) suggest that during the third merger wave risk 
diversification played a large role in M&A policy – as prior to the 1980s managers 
had insufficient incentive to focus on shareholder concerns – and it has been 
suggested that the rise of the conglomerate may be an outgrowth of this principle-
agent problem (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). 
2
 Mueller (1969) introduced mergers as a vehicle for growth maximization (not profit 
maximization), and Williamson (1964) complements this by introducing company 
cars, excess staff or prestigious investments as complementary motives. Rhoades 
(1983) analyses the third merger wave, and shows that managerial power serves as 
an explanation of firm growth through M&A, and concludes that the power motive 
replaced the profit motive as the driving force behind large companies' behaviour.  
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Modifying and Applying Merger Theories to SMEs  
The merger theories described above has evolved from the analysis of 
relatively large-scale deals by public acquirers, with little effort being 
explicitly made to understanding the role of SMEs. However, we suggest 
that SMEs are, different to their larger rivals, for at least two reasons. 
 
Table 2: Refining the set of Applicable Merger Motives 
Outcome Benefits How? Theory  Link SMEs? 
Gains Owners  
 
Net gains through 
operative synergies 
 
Efficiency 
 
Synergy 
High 
 
Wealth transfers 
from customers 
 
Market Power Medium 
 
Net gains through 
managerial 
synergies 
 
Corporate 
Control 
Medium 
Losses  
Owner 
Intended 
 
Net losses though 
overpaying  
 
Hubris 
Bounded 
Rationality 
Medium 
 
Net losses due to 
valuation mistakes 
 
Managerial 
Discretion  
Medium 
Manager 
 
Net losses as 
managers make 
acquisitions to 
reinforce job 
positions 
 
Entrenchment  
Agency 
Costs 
Low 
 
Net losses as 
managers make 
acquisitions to 
increase firm size  
 
Empire 
Building  
Low 
 
 
Firstly, we suggest that because the manager is often the owner in the 
case of an SME, many of the value-destroying theories discussed above 
will simply not apply. Most of the value-destroying theories we 
considered arose out of agency problems – that is, problems of competing 
and not overlapping objective functions – which occur with the separation 
of ownership and control. In the case of owner-mangers, however, 
principle-agent costs are removed, and so the theories of entrenchment and 
empire-building are unlikely to play a part in SME M&As.   
Secondly, and even in the case of a principle-agent structure, we 
suggest that the information asymmetries, which facilitate self-interested 
behaviour, will be reduced in the case of SMEs. Larger firms, we suggest, 
have deeper hierarchies, more dispersed responsibilities and more 
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complex systems of accountability then their smaller peers, and this 
obstructs transparency and information symmetries. We suggest that the 
level of information asymmetry suffered by the firm is inversely related to 
its size, and that smaller firms will allow self-interested managers fewer 
opportunities to act in a self-interested way. Thus the likelihood that 
agency motives will play a role in SMEs is significantly reduced.  
By refining the set of merger motives to exclude the agency motives 
(see Table 2), we can clearly see that SME M&As will more often be 
made in the interests of the owners. Only hubris and the problems of over-
valuation remain as potential sources of value destruction, but according 
to Moeller et al., (2004) these too should be less of a problem in SMEs. 
Moeller et al., (2004) examines a sample of 12,023 mergers over the 
period 1980 to 2001 and finds that large firms are more likely to complete 
a deal then small firms because, they suggest, hubris is more of a problem 
for larger firms. Managers in smaller firms, they suggested, are as likely to 
make the same boundedly rational mistakes as their colleagues in larger 
firms, but because the interests of managers in small firms are more 
closely aligned with the owners, the managers in small firms are more 
likely to withdraw from a deal once they realise their mistakes (for 
instance, in a due diligence prior to consummation). Evidence that the 
number of value-destroying mistakes is reduced in the case of SMEs 
should thus be found by looking at the number of withdrawn bids, and so 
we operationalise our intuition that value-destroying motives are less 
likely to play a role with SME M&As with the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: SMEs are more likely to withdraw from (arguably value-
destroying) mergers than large enterprises 
2.3. How do SMEs perform in M&As?  
From the preceding discussion we can assume that SME M&As face a 
higher probability of successful mergers than their larger rivals. They face 
lower agency costs, and are more likely to be withdrawn when motivated, 
we suggest, by mistakes and misevaluations. Because of this we believe 
that SME M&A will, on average, demonstrate superior performance. 
Precious little attention has been paid, however, to the role of the SME 
performance within the M&A industry. The near standard methodology in 
most M&A research is, in fact, to place a lower limit on deal value – 
typically in the range of $10 to $50 million – with the deliberate intention 
of excluding smaller firms with smaller deals (e.g., Schlingemann, 2004).  
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Research has shown, however, that size matters when it comes to 
performance, and that the two are inversely related. Carline et al. (2002), 
for example, shows that larger deal values predict poorer performance, and 
this has lead to the suggestion that smaller firms, making smaller deals, 
may make better acquirers. Moeller et al (2004, 2005) empirically confirm 
this suggestion. Defining small firms as those firms whose capitalisation 
falls below the 25th percentile of NYSE, Moeller et al (2004) show that 
small acquisitions made by small firms are typically profitable, whereas 
large firms making large acquisitions often result in large dollar losses. In 
their sample they find that shareholders from small firms earned roughly 
$9 billion from their acquisitions during the period 1980-2001, whereas 
shareholders from large firms made significant losses over the period of 
about $312 billion. Defining ‗large loss deals‘ as acquisitions with 
shareholder wealth losses in excess of $1 billion, Moeller et al (2005) find, 
in fact, that while such mega-loss deals represent only 2.1% of all M&A 
events which occurred in the period 1998-2001, they account for 43.4% of 
the money spent on acquisitions. By doing so, Moeller et al. (2005) show 
that relatively few large loss-making deals contribute significantly and 
disproportionally to the low average performance of mergers, and provide 
some solid evidence that small firms may perform above average.   
Consequently, the literature suggests that smaller firms, on average, 
will make for better acquirers, and because furthermore the M&As that 
they pursue will be more likely to create value, we believe that M&A is 
likely to be an important growth strategy for SME. We predict that SME 
managers will be aware of this, and consequently we predict that SMEs 
will make up a sizable proportion of the annual M&A population.  
Hypothesis 2: SMEs that pursue external growth and engage in M&A 
activities, do so with the same or even greater intensity 
than large enterprises. 
2.4. How do SMEs finance M&As? 
Mergers and acquisitions are big business - average deal size (based on 
disclosed prices) was $198.2 million in 2006 (Wilmerhale, 2007) - and 
this raises the question as to how SMEs go about raising M&A finance.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that different funds come at different 
costs for different firms. For public firms, they suggest, external financing 
options are more costly than internal financing options, because external 
capital is subject to adverse selection and transaction costs caused by the 
existence of asymmetric information between the firms managers and its 
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investors. Internally generated cash – in the form of free cash and retained 
earnings – is not subject to these costs, and so is the cheapest form of 
capital1. Several studies have shown that cash-financed deals are, 
consequently, more beneficial (or at least less detrimental) to bidding 
shareholders (e.g., Carow et al., 2004; Huang and Walking, 1987).  
With externally sourced options, debt is cheaper than equity because 
convincing one bank to invest, it is suggested, incurs less costs than 
convincing a group of own/old acquirer shareholders to vote for an M&A 
deal, and to dilute their stock, before then convincing a group of 
target/new shareholders to accept this new stock (Carpenter, 1995). Thus, 
Myers and Mailuf (1984) propose a financial ‗pecking order hypothesis‘ in 
the form: internal cash, then debt and then equity. 
We suggest that, for the special case of SME financing, the theory does 
not fully apply. Internal cash reserves will, we argue, remain the preferred 
source of capital for SMEs but, because of their special features, the 
relative costs and benefits of using debt and equity will differ.  
We have already argued that many SMEs are owner-managed, and so if 
the holdings of old shareholders are diluted – for example, by the issue of 
new stocks for the target shareholders to finance the deal with a stock-for-
stock exchange – then this will be done, we suggest, by managers who are 
also incumbent shareholders, and thus free from information asymmetries. 
Bae et al. (2002) find some supportive evidence for this conclusion.  
Using the same argument, we suggest that the costs involved in 
convincing the target shareholders to accept the stock of the acquirer will 
also be lower for SMEs. SMEs, it is argued, buy smaller targets, which are 
also more often owner-managed than larger enterprise. If these target 
managers, sitting on the other side of the table, go through all the 
negotiations and all the due diligence reports with the owner-managers of 
the acquirer, then the information symmetry faced by them, as receivers of 
the newly issued shares, will also be reduced. Furthermore, it is suggested 
that even if some of firms are publicly quoted, SMEs typically will have 
more concentrated block-holders than larger firms with more atomistic 
ownership, which makes it easier to approach and easier to convince.  
Because these shareholders will also have a seat in the board, they will 
again face relatively less information asymmetries to their larger rivals.  
In contrast, going to a bank, remains a relatively costly option. Next to 
the costs of negotiating with the acquirer – which in the case above, would 
                                                 
1
 Indeed a number of studies suggest that firms with internal cash reserves are better able 
to adapt to a changing business environment (see e.g., Bruner, 1988, Wan and Yin, 
2009), and excess liquidity and financial slack is an important feature for innovative 
firms (see e.g., Nohria and Gulanti, 1996, Damanpour, 1987, Majumdar and 
Venkataraman, 1993, Singh, 1986) experimenting with new products, technologies 
or markets (e.g., Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993, Moses, 1992).  
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be sufficient to arrange a stock-for-stock exchange – a third party, the 
banks, is required in the case of debt, and these too have to be convinced 
to finance the deal. Smaller companies tend to be less transparent than 
larger companies, and this creates difficulties for banks, and raises costs. 
Thus, the pecking order for SMEs is cash, then stock and then debt. If the 
deal is too large to be financed with internal cash/retained earnings, stock-
for-stock-exchange is, we argue, the next best means of financing.  
For SMEs, financing with internal cash is an unlikely scenario. SMEs 
are unlikely to have the necessary liquid resources to cover the cost of an 
acquisition, and cognisant of the importance of retaining a ‗cushion of 
liquidity‘ (Cyert and March, 1963), they are unlikely to over-utilise their 
internal options. Cash in SME transactions will more likely come from 
external debt sources, and because we have argued that these represent the 
more costly option, we expect that the consideration paid to the target will 
be comprised of more stock and less cash than the average large deal. This 
leads us to postulate a third and final hypothesis on SMEs and M&As:  
Hypothesis 3: SMEs use more stock and less cash as means of payment 
than large enterprises. 
3. Data & Methodology 
3.1 Sample Design 
To test our hypotheses on M&As between SMEs we employ data from 
Thomson Reuters‘ well-known SDC merger database, and analyse all 
acquisitions that satisfy the following conditions. (1) the acquisition is 
announced between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2007; (2) the 
acquisition is either completed or withdrawn, but not pending or 
rumoured; (3) the acquirer is located either in the U.S. or in Western 
Europe1; (4) the target is located in the same country as the acquirer; (5) 
the acquisition does not involve a recapitalisation, self-tender, repurchase 
of shares, privatization, or spin-off to existing shareholders; (6) the 
acquirer is not operating in the financial sector (SIC 6000-6999), in public 
administration (two-digit-SIC 91-99), or in an unknown industry (SIC 
0000); (7) the acquirer and the target are not owned by the same ultimate 
                                                 
1
 As defined in the database, including Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Guernsey, 
Vatican City, Iceland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway (incl. Svalbard/Jan Mayer Islands), Portugal, 
Republic of Ireland, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
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parent; (8) the acquirer seeks full ownership of the target; and (9) the 
variables needed to run our analyses (see next section) are not missing. 
This refinement process produces a sample of 17,137 M&A observations. 
We classify acquirers according to the latest European Commission 
definitions on SMEs (see Table 2), as derived by Johnson (2007). 
3.2 Variable Description 
As dependent variables in our analysis we use: (1) deal value per 
merger and deal frequency per acquirer normalised with (that is, divided 
by) total assets, total sales, and number of employees of acquirer; (2) the 
percentage of stock, cash, other in consideration; and (3) a dummy for 
completed merger (=1, 0=withdrawn). As independent variables we use: 
(1) a dummy for micro firms, small firms, medium firms, large firms, 
each; and (2) a dummy for SMEs (non-large firms=1, large firms=0).  
Furthermore, and as an extensive body of literature shows that a 
number of firm- and deal-specific characteristics affect M&A behaviour 
(see King, et al., 2004 for an overview), we include a number of control 
variables in our model to account for unobserved effects. We include: 
 
Public versus Private: Officer (2007), Chang (1998) and Bargeron et al 
(2007) each provide evidence that returns in publicly listed firms 
differs significantly from private targets, and so we control for: (1) the 
acquirer and (2) the target by status (using a dummy in each case) 
 
Hostility: The hostility of the takeover has been shown to impact 
returns, although here the evidence is somewhat mixed (Schwert, 
2000). To account for this possibility, however, we include an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the target‘s board officially rejects the bid. 
 
Size: As Moeller et al. (2004, 2005) shows, large deals often under 
perform, and therefore we include the log of the deal value (not used in 
regressions in M&A intensity – dependent variables (1) above – as then 
deal value would be on the left and right hand side of estimation) 
 
Consideration: It has been shown that stock payments are more 
frequently associated with lower returns to acquirer shareholders (see 
e.g., Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001). To control for this, we 
include the percentage of consideration paid in cash and stock (but not 
in the case of H3 testing, as it is dependent variable there). 
Time, Type, Trends & Location: Furthermore, we dummy for (1) the 
location of the acquirer (in US=1, 0 if otherwise); (2) time, so as to 
control for the possibility of year- and seasonal-specific unobserved 
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effects; and finally, (3) industries, on the basis of SIC 1 level codes, so 
as to capture industry-specific effects. Finally, we use the year of the 
merger as a count variable to capture trending effects. 
 
Table 3: SME Mergers per year and industry 
No. of deals in… 
per…
micro 
enterprises
small 
enterprises
medium 
enterprises
large 
enterprises Total SME in %
YEAR
1996 3 21 190 1,004 1,218 17.6%
1997 2 22 249 1,368 1,641 16.6%
1998 6 48 243 1,576 1,873 15.9%
1999 14 95 364 1,385 1,858 25.5%
2000 28 108 421 1,293 1,850 30.1%
2001 22 76 222 981 1,301 24.6%
2002 26 61 147 956 1,190 19.7%
2003 29 59 147 869 1,104 21.3%
2004 19 88 225 951 1,283 25.9%
2005 23 66 192 996 1,277 22.0%
2006 18 84 177 1,017 1,296 21.5%
2007 24 53 178 991 1,246 20.5%
Total 214 781 2,755 13,387 17,137 21.9%
INDUSTRY (acq)
Agriculture 1 0 12 61 74 17.6%
Mining 40 42 62 458 602 23.9%
Construction 2 7 38 300 347 13.5%
Manufacturing 52 226 822 5,100 6,200 17.7%
Transp.,Utility 1 14 65 850 930 8.6%
Communication 11 51 135 947 1,144 17.2%
Wholesale,Retail 18 54 165 1,375 1,612 14.7%
Services 89 387 1,456 4,296 6,228 31.0%
Total 214 781 2,755 13,387 17,137 21.9%
LOCATION
Western Europe 32 280 857 2,880 4,049 28.9%
USA 182 501 1,898 10,507 13,088 19.7%
Total 214 781 2,755 13,387 17,137 21.9%
STATUS (tar)
target public 54 203 797 6,595 7,649 13.8%
target private 160 578 1,958 6,792 9,488 28.4%
Total 214 781 2,755 13,387 17,137 21.9%  
 
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptives  
Table 3 reports the number of M&A deals per year, industry, location 
and by type, according to the European Commissions definitions of micro, 
small, medium and large enterprises, as well as the total number of deals.  
From it we can make a number of important observations:  
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Firstly, we can clearly see that, as Moeller et al (2005) suggest, small 
M&As are overwhelmed in the average statistics by large M&A: 214 
micro-enterprise M&As versus 13,387 large firm deals. Despite this we 
see that SMEs account for about 20% of the total deals over the period; 
with a high in 2000, when SMEs accounted for 30%, and a low in 1998 at 
a level of 15.9%. This are, we suggest, sizable numbers.  
Secondly, and looking at the industry level, we see that SME M&As 
are more often observed in services and manufacturing, and least often in 
transportation and utilities. As the latter are the most likely to be subject to 
minimum efficient scale considerations, this result is an intuitive one.  
Thirdly, we see that, in absolute terms, the lions share of the SME 
M&As is in the US (2581 versus 1169), but that relatively speaking, 
proportionally more SME M&As occurred in Europe. During the period 
January 1996 to December 2007, 28.9% of all Western European M&As 
were SME orientated, as opposed to 19.7% of all American M&As.  
Finally, we see that – in all three of our SME categories, and in 
comparison to larger firms too – private targets are much more common 
than public targets in our sample. This observation provides some 
suggestive evidence in favour of our third hypothesis.  
 
Table 4: Pairwise Correlations   
 
 
Table 4 then reports on the pairwise correlation for a number of 
important variables employed in the study. We also check for 
multicollinearity, which does not appear to be a serious issue in this study. 
4.2. Hypothesis One: On Withdrawn and Completed Mergers 
We suggest that M&As amongst SMEs are more likely to be motivated 
by value-enhancing objectives in general, and less likely than larger firms 
to complete a value-destroying deal made subject to bounded rationality. 
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 completed deal      0.96      0.20      0.00      1.00
2 target size (log deal value)      3.25      2.10     -6.91     12.01 -0.13
(0.00)
3 acquirer privately owned      0.01      0.10      0.00      1.00 0.01 -0.03
(0.38) (0.00)
4 target privately owned      0.55      0.50      0.00      1.00 0.11 -0.33 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.51)
5 target friendly      0.99      0.12      0.00      1.00 0.27 -0.12 0.01 0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00)
6 paid in cash (pct)     41.03     44.67      0.00    100.00 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01
(0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11)
7 paid in stock (pct)     24.59     38.95      0.00    100.00 -0.12 0.11 -0.03 0.07 -0.01 -0.46
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.40) (0.00)
8 paid other (pct)      8.43     19.97      0.00    100.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.10 0.01 -0.15 -0.12
(0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00)
9 acquirer in U.S.      0.76      0.42      0.00      1.00 -0.02 0.25 -0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.12 -0.13
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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SME M&As, we suggest, are less likely to be completed when driven by 
overvaluations, mistakes or miscalculations, and so SMEs are more likely 
than larger firms to be withdrawn. We test this hypothesis by looking at 
the percentage of withdrawn and completed deals per firm category.  
Table 5 reports the results of this investigation on a univariate basis. 
From this we can clearly see some evidence in support of our hypothesis 
that the increasing size of the firm and the proportion of the deals that they 
complete are positively related. Small and micro-firms complete less deals 
than medium sized firms, who in turn complete less deals than larger firm. 
 
Table 5: The Percentage of Completed Deals by Firm Size  
Enterprise size completed*
micro 93.93%
small 92.06%
medium 95.17%
large 96.35%
Total 95.93%
* SME average statistically different from
   large enterprise average at 0.05
   significance level (two-sided ttest)  
 
Table 6 investigates the relationship further, and presents the results of 
a logistic maximum likelihood estimation, which uses a dummy for 
completed mergers as the dependent variable. Instead of coefficients we 
report the odds ratios for a better understanding of the economic effects. 
From the results we can see that the relationship between increasing firm 
size and the increasing likelihood of a withdrawal is robust: each of the 
disaggregated size categories (micro, small and medium) for the acquiring 
firm, as well as the aggregated SME variable, are significant at the 1% 
level. The odds ratios for all three size category dummies are clearly 
below 1, which indicates that they are less likely to complete a merger 
than large firms. For micro firms and small firms, the odds of completing 
a merger are, respectively, 0.195 and 0.162 times the odds of a large firm 
to complete. In other words, the odds to withdraw from a deal are more 
than 5 times as large (1/0.195=5.13, 1/0.162=6.17) than the odds for a 
large firm. For medium sized firms, the odds of deal completion (0.336) 
are roughly two times higher than for micro and small firms. This deal 
completion likelihood, however, is still only about third of that for large 
firms. The same is true for the SME dummy in Model 3, which shows the 
combined effect of the three individual size dummies. 
 
Table 6: Logistic maximum likelihood estimation 
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Dependent
Logit estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
micro enterprise 0.195***
                [-4.937]
small enterprise 0.162***
                [-9.858]
medium enterprise 0.336***
                [-8.590]
SME             0.284***
                [-10.855]
acquirer privately owned 1.117 1.322 1.286
                [0.193] [0.505] [0.452]
target privately owned 2.525*** 2.657*** 2.652***
                [9.062] [9.457] [9.488]
target friendly 20.830*** 21.080*** 21.188***
                [19.225] [19.195] [19.220]
target size (log deal value) 0.887*** 0.787*** 0.796***
                [-5.040] [-9.453] [-9.067]
acquirer in U.S. 1.087 1.065 1.061
                [0.704] [0.522] [0.494]
trend variable (year) 1.02 1.036 1.031
                [0.887] [1.595] [1.372]
paid in cash (pct) 1.001 1 1
                [0.414] [0.191] [0.233]
paid in stock (pct) 0.987*** 0.990*** 0.990***
                [-9.725] [-7.089] [-7.460]
constant 0 0 0
                [-0.871] [-1.562] [-1.341]
year dummies y y y
industry dummies y y y
P-Micro-Small 0.5958
P-Small-Medium 0.0001
P-Micro-Medium 0.0995
observations (N) 17137 17137 17137
clusters (N)    6166 6166 6166
chi square      802.451 921.247 905.81
Nagelkerke r2   0.155 0.179 0.176
prob > chi2     0 0 0
z-values in parenthesis; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table reports odds ratios with robust variance estimators.
P-Micro-Small is the p-value in a Wald (1940) test that compares the coefficients
of the micro and small enterprise dummies. If the null hypothesis is rejected,
the coefficients are not equal to each other. P-Small-Medium and P-Micro-Medium 
are computed analogously. The standard errors in all models allow for correlation 
between mergers by the same acquirer.
Completed deal dummy
 
We also test for differences between the odds ratios of three size 
categories. Table 6 reports the p-values of the null hypothesis that the odds 
ratios of the three dummies are equal (see Wald, 1940). While we find no 
statistical difference between the deal completion likelihoods of micro 
firms and small firms, the odds ratios of both size categories differ at a 
10% and a 0.01% confidence level from medium sized firms. The control 
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variables, target firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of the deal 
value, also has a statistically significant odds ratio below one. Further, we 
find that the greater the percentage of stock offered in the deal the greater 
the likelihood that the deal will be withdrawn. Following Moeller et al., 
(2004), we interpret an increased likelihood of withdrawal to signal a 
reduction in the proportion of value-destruction, and so infer that SME 
M&As are less likely to be pursued for value-destroying reasons. 
4.3. Hypothesis Two: On M&A Popularity  
Our second hypothesis suggest that, because SME M&As are more 
likely to be pursued for value-increasing motives, SMEs will pursue 
external growth opportunities through mergers, and will engage in M&A 
activity with the same – if not greater – intensity than large enterprises. 
We test this by looking at the frequency of deals and the deal size, 
normalised over total assets, number of employees, and total sales. Table 7 
presents the results of results of univariate results of our investigation. 
From this already we can clearly see that SMEs which merge at least once 
in the observed period (i.e. enter the sample) rely significantly more 
heavily on external growth than large firms in the same period.  
 
Table 7: M&As amongst SMEs 
Enterprise size
deal value/ 
employee*
deal value/ 
assets*
deal value/ 
sales*
deal no./ 
assets*
micro 5.686 584.783 107.123 8
small 0.599 197.192 12.004 1.28
medium 0.226 30.4 1.096 0.211
large 0.108 0.778 0.267 0.022
Total 0.219 21.784 2.27 0.209
* SME average statistically different from large enterprise average
   at 0.05 significance level (two-sided ttest)  
 
Table 8 presents the results of an OLS regression which further 
explores this finding, and employs a number of different measures of 
merger intensity as the dependent variable. For all models we use a 
Breusch-Pagan (1980) test to investigate whether or not the disturbances 
are normally distributed. As Table 8 shows, the corresponding p-values 
reject this null hypothesis. We therefore use heteroskedasticity-consistent 
estimators of variance in all models. 
 
Table 8: M&As amongst SMEs  
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Dependent
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
micro enterprise 107.088** 586.949** 5.571*** 7.953***
                [2.384] [2.214] [4.290] [5.649]
small enterprise 11.821** 195.274* 0.508*** 1.254***
                [2.136] [1.846] [8.764] [4.147]
medium enterprise 0.663* 28.624** 0.126*** 0.194***
                [1.917] [2.463] [6.031] [7.364]
SME             9.160*** 95.406*** 0.521*** 0.864***
                [3.075] [3.422] [6.460] [7.517]
acquirer privately owned -1.829 -1.547 -39.109** -32.702** -0.115** -0.109** -0.079 -0.048
                [-1.323] [-1.149] [-2.226] [-2.538] [-2.058] [-2.424] [-0.847] [-0.550]
target privately owned 0.599 1.017 -15.536 -12.763 -0.115*** -0.095*** 0.056 0.088**
                [0.991] [1.370] [-1.164] [-0.971] [-3.318] [-2.626] [1.564] [2.237]
target friendly -1.446** -1.111** 4.65 6.687 -0.199*** -0.183*** -0.012 0.013
                [-2.368] [-1.998] [0.547] [0.731] [-3.453] [-3.168] [-0.573] [0.461]
acquirer in U.S. 0.608 2.103 -5.757 1.242 0.046 0.124** 0.048 0.155***
                [0.473] [1.170] [-0.299] [0.070] [0.828] [2.187] [1.029] [2.846]
trend variable (year) 0.165 0.348 -1.165* -0.036 0.002 0.011*** -0.007* 0.007*
                [0.562] [1.181] [-1.960] [-0.131] [0.563] [3.677] [-1.826] [1.735]
constant -333.165 -698.447 2314.894* 64.686 -3.512 -21.620*** 14.320* -13.072*
                [-0.569] [-1.187] [1.954] [0.114] [-0.501] [-3.572] [1.810] [-1.735]
year dummies y y y y y y y y
industry dummies y y y y y y y y
P-Breusch-Pagan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P-Micro-Small 0.0343 0.1699 0.0001 0
P-Small-Medium 0.0512 0.1198 0 0.0003
P-Micro-Medium 0.0175 0.0351 0 0
observations (N) 17137 17137 17137 17137 17137 17137 17137 17137
clusters (N)    6166 6166 6166 6166 6166 6166 6166 6166
F               2.903 2.79 1.331 1.505 12.523 12.233 10.03 7.902
adjusted r2     0.022 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.071 0.011 0.099 0.017
prob > F        0 0 0.125 0.057 0 0 0 0
t-values in parenthesis; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
P-Breusch-Pagan is the p-value in Breusch-Pagan’s (1980) test. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the regression
disturbances are not normally distributed and heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators of variance are used.
P-Micro-Small is the p-value in a Wald (1940) test that compares the coefficients of the micro and small enterprise 
dummies. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the coefficients are not equal to each other.
P-Small-Medium and P-Micro-Medium are computed analogously.
The standard errors in all models allow for correlation between mergers by the same acquirer.
deal value /
total sales
deal value /
total assets
deal value /
employees
deal freq. /
total assets
 
 
The positive and statistically significant coefficients of the size 
dummies support our previous finding that SMEs which merge during the 
observed period rely more heavily on external growth than large firms in 
all three of our measurements. This result is robust, whether we identify 
micro, small or medium sized firms independently or aggregate them as 
one category (SME dummy).1 When comparing the coefficients of the size 
dummies (see p-values) we find that they are all statistically different from 
                                                 
1 The large coefficients of the micro firm dummy suggest a robustness check where we 
exclude all micro firms from the sample and re-estimate the models in Table 8. The 
results do not change qualitatively. 
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each other, with the exception of Model 3, where we normalize deal 
values with total assets rather than total sales or employee numbers.1 
 
Table 9: Cash and Stock as a Means of Payment 
Enterprise size cash* stock* other*
micro 18.06% 53.05% 11.99%
small 25.97% 44.45% 13.76%
medium 31.63% 37.61% 11.58%
large 44.22% 20.30% 7.42%
Total 41.03% 24.59% 8.43%
* SME average statistically different from large enterprise average
   at 0.05 significance level (two-sided ttest)  
Figure 1: Average percent of stock in consideration over years and types of enterprises. 
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4.4. Hypothesis Three: On Merger Finance and the Pecking Order 
Finally, and in looking at our third hypothesis, which suggests that 
SMEs will use more stock and less cash as means of payment than large 
enterprises, we consider whether SMEs have a higher/lower stock/cash 
percentage in their consideration than larger companies. Table 9 presents 
the result of our investigation, again first on a univariate basis.  
From this we can clearly see that the probability that a firm pays with 
stock decreases quite significantly as the size of the firm grows, while the 
probability that it pays with cash increases, without exception.  
 
                                                 
1 We control for industries that may point towards less structural differences in external 
growth strategies of SMEs in more asset-intensive sectors like manufacturing. 
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Table 10: Cash and Stock as a Means of Payment 
Dependent
OLS estimation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
micro enterprise 46.445*** -30.319*** 6.252***
                [13.668] [-11.895] [3.242]
small enterprise 34.548*** -21.432*** 6.713***
                [19.774] [-13.172] [6.083]
medium enterprise 21.831*** -12.770*** 4.298***
                [20.380] [-11.931] [7.399]
SME             25.600*** -15.378*** 4.873***
                [26.180] [-15.525] [9.121]
acquirer privately owned -12.118*** -11.631*** -12.061*** -12.390*** -4.721*** -4.620***
                [-3.878] [-3.765] [-2.787] [-2.894] [-3.025] [-2.947]
target privately owned 7.704*** 7.682*** -7.736*** -7.720*** 4.293*** 4.291***
                [11.124] [11.064] [-9.580] [-9.554] [12.440] [12.427]
target friendly 0.484 0.302 -1.798 -1.671 1.522 1.498
                [0.182] [0.113] [-0.599] [-0.554] [1.367] [1.346]
target size (log deal value) 4.888*** 4.718*** -1.406*** -1.287*** 0.775*** 0.754***
                [24.697] [23.808] [-6.436] [-5.926] [8.579] [8.329]
acquirer in U.S. 5.275*** 5.716*** -5.384*** -5.698*** -5.955*** -5.923***
                [6.741] [7.260] [-5.136] [-5.451] [-10.443] [-10.397]
trend variable (year) -2.083*** -2.015*** 1.877*** 1.830*** -0.107 -0.099
                [-13.271] [-12.788] [10.390] [10.100] [-1.464] [-1.351]
constant 4155.712*** 4022.857*** -3697.257*** -3604.009*** 219.446 203.778
                [13.220] [12.742] [-10.229] [-9.941] [1.503] [1.391]
year dummies y y y y y y
industry dummies y y y y y y
P-Breusch-Pagan 0 0 0 0 0 0
P-Micro-Small 0.0012 0.0012 0.05
P-Small-Medium 0 0 0.425
P-Micro-Medium 0 0 0.98
observations (N) 17137 17137 17137 17137 17137 17137
clusters (N)    6166 6166 6166 6166 6166 6166
F               81.962 84.192 42.115 43.161 15.243 16.309
adjusted r2     0.175 0.168 0.078 0.076 0.042 0.042
prob > F        0 0 0 0 0 0
t-values in parenthesis; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
P-Breusch-Pagan is the p-value in Breusch-Pagan’s (1980) test. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the regression
disturbances are not normally distributed and heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators of variance are used.
P-Micro-Small is the p-value in a Wald (1940) test that compares the coefficients of the micro and small enterprise 
dummies. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the coefficients are not equal to each other.
P-Small-Medium and P-Micro-Medium are computed analogously.
The standard errors in all models allow for correlation between mergers by the same acquirer.
% paid in stock % paid in cash % paid in other
 
Figure 1 shows how this developed over time. From it we can see that 
stock payments decreased in relative importance during the course of the 
last merger wave – when the cost of credit was at historical lows – but that 
the order of preference for stock in SME and large firm M&As holds 
constant in almost all years. Micro firms use the most stock in their 
dealings, small less than that, medium even less, and large firms the least. 
To ensure the robustness of this conclusion, and before we accept our 
hypothesis on the source and nature of SME M&A financing, we conduct 
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OLS regressions using percentage of stock, cash and other means of 
payment – e.g. acquirer debt directly issued to target shareholders. Table 
10 presents the results, and provides clear support for Hypothesis 3.   
As suggested by the p-values of the Breusch-Pagan (1980) test, we use 
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators of variance in all models. We also 
test whether the coefficients of the size dummies are equal and reject this 
null hypothesis in all cases but two (differences to medium sized firms in 
Model 5). In other words, we do not find a difference between medium 
sized firms and other SME size categories when we look at payments that 
are neither cash nor stock. Although interesting as an additional insight, 
this result does not weaken the support for Hypothesis 3. Firstly, 
Hypothesis 3 predicts differences between SMEs and large firms, not 
within SMEs. Secondly, when we focus on the use of stock and cash as 
preferred methods of payment we find highly significant differences 
between all size groups: micro, small, medium, and large (Models 1-4). 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we noted that the existing M&A literature is dominated by 
the analysis of larger firms making large deals, and suggested that SMEs 
may differ from these in their acquisition behaviour. We presented direct 
and indirect evidence to illustrate this point, and showed that the conduct 
and financial success of mergers, by entrepreneurial firms, is indeed 
significantly different to large public firms. To account for this, we 
considered the applicability of the dominant motivating theories – the 
theories of efficiency, market power and corporate control, managerial 
hubris, discretion, and entrenchments, Q-theory, raider theory and empire 
building – as well as the pecking-order theory of merger finance. We 
made a number of modifications to the theory of mergers and acquisitions, 
by adapting and translating the literature on large M&As to the special 
situation of SMEs. In the process we came to a number of conclusions:  
 
(1) There are proportionally more SME M&As in Europe than in the 
US. Our results show that about 30% of Western European M&A were 
by SMEs. As much of the European merger regulation focuses on large 
M&As, our findings indicate a possible need for more differentiated 
policies with respect to SMEs M&As. 
 
(2) Smaller firms are more likely to withdraw from M&A agreement, 
and seem to be more flexible in walking away from value-destroying 
mergers. Our results support the conclusion that larger firms perform 
less well in M&As, and the suggestion that the large losses made by the 
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few may blot out the small successes made the many, when analysed in 
average terms.  
 
(3) Merger theory needs to be modified for SME M&As. Our results 
indicate that agency costs are significantly reduced for SMEs, and that 
boundedly rational value-destroying actions are less likely to be seen 
through to their conclusion. Accordingly, we suggest that merger 
theory needs to be updated for the special case of SME M&A.  
 
(4) M&As are a more popular growth strategy for SMEs. Our results 
show that M&As are popular options for SMEs, and even more so than 
for large firms. This again stresses the importance of more 
differentiated M&A policies. 
 
(5) Smaller firms finance M&A primarily with stock. Our results show 
that the pecking order hypothesis only partially applies to SMEs, and 
that this too needs to be updated for the special case of SMEs. 
 
In doing so, this paper provides both direct and indirect evidence, 
which suggests that small firms behave and perform differently in their 
mergers and acquisitions. Our paper thus contributes to a better 
understanding of SME M&As and why these are so different to the large 
public acquirers typically studied within the wider literature.  
Data limitations loom large in the study of SME M&As, however and 
we suggest that much work still needs to be done to better understand 
these special firms. Clearly subject definitions need to be agreed upon, and 
an exploration of appropriate performance measures – or proxies – for 
SME M&As would make a valuable contribution to the literature.  
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